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Switzerland
Abstract
The paper analyzes the effect of mother tongue on labor market outcomes of Swiss residents. This type
of analysis can shed light on an important policy question. Is the Swiss labor market well integrated, or
can one find instead segmentation along language borders? Improving on previous research in this area,
we use a nationally representative household survey, the Swiss Household Panel 1999 and 2000, and we
explicitly account for self-selection of workers into language areas. Overall, we find no evidence to
suggest that the Swiss labor market is not perfectly integrated or that internal migrants are positively
selected.
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1. Introduction
Economists have not taken great interest in the study of language so far, with the 
notable exception of the economic analysis of immigration, where investments in 
language skills are recognized as decisive for the integration process (C, 
, D and F, ). However, this dismissive attitude may be 
about to change. One challenge is the surge of research at the intersection of psy-
chology and economics that aims to establish a richer model of human behav-
ior and motivation, opening up the black box of “given preferences”. Cognitive 
processes – language being an integral part of it – move to center stage. Indeed, 
according to a well-known theory in linguistics, language determines thought 
and action (W, 1956). 
A second development is the increased recognition that social interactions are 
important for understanding human behavior and economic outcomes. Again, 
language is an integral aspect. A third question is linked to globalization: in a 
globalized world, is the optimal number of languages in the world greater than, or 
equal to, one? These examples are indicative of, though by no means exhausting, 
the type of language related questions economists might become interested in. 
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The topic of the current paper directly relates to the second and third points, 
the role of language as an integrating or disintegrating force of economic activ-
ity. What is the role of language, in relation to other factors such as jurisdiction 
and geography, to shape markets? What borders matter more, those of countries 
or those of shared language? Often these two coincide but almost as often they 
do not, as the examples of many English speaking countries on one hand, and 
multilingual countries such a Switzerland and Belgium on the other, illustrate. 
We approach the issue of shared language in the context of labor markets, 
using the Swiss experience as a case study. Switzerland has four official languages: 
German, French, Italian and Romansh, although the latter one is spoken only by 
a small minority. The three main languages correspond to three largely homoge-
neous linguistic regions. In such a multilingual country one might expect that 
language diversity generates segmented labor markets. 
In this paper, we test whether labor markets are integrated along language 
frontiers. Labor market integration can be defined in a number of ways. In a first 
definition the “law of one wage” holds across linguistic regions: workers of simi-
lar skills receive the same wage, regardless of linguistic region. There are three 
classical mechanisms that each result in the law of one wage: perfect mobility of 
workers, of capital, or of goods. 
An alternative definition of integration is that the law of one wage holds within 
any given linguistic region when comparing native and nonnative workers, i.e., 
workers whose mother tongue matches the dominant language and those for 
whom this is not the case. In the following we will often implicitly assume that 
people become nonnatives by moving across a language border although this is, 
strictly speaking, not required for our definition of nonnative, i.e., people might 
have been raised in a non-dominant language as mother tongue. 
We concentrate in our paper on this second form of integration because it 
relates specifically to the effect of language. In contrast, when comparing wages 
across linguistic regions, wage differentials are affected by non-linguistic factors 
as well, such as geography, institutions, industrial structure and the like. Thus, 
we compare wages of natives and nonnatives in a given linguistic region, and 
evaluate the extent to which language matters for earnings. We will answer this 
question using different methods, carefully addressing the issue of self-selec-
tion bias that can result if the nonnatives observed in the sample (i.e. those who 
decided to live and work in a region where their mother tongue does not match 
the dominant language) are not a random selection of all nonnatives. 
The implications of such a study extend beyond the Swiss case as its meth-
ods and results can be applied to other multilingual countries such as Belgium 
or Canada, as well as common markets such as the European Union, where 
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despite the cultural and linguistic differences among their members, there are 
no legal barriers for residents of member countries to move from one country 
to another. 
The paper uses data from the Swiss Household Panel, which are well suited 
for this purpose as they provide information on the respondents’ language skills, 
place of residence and income. There are momentarily no other representative 
survey data available in Switzerland, which include all the necessary informa-
tion for such an analysis. The decennial census, for example, has the advantage 
of providing information on language spoken and region of residence for the 
entire population but it does not contain any information on income or earn-
ings. Another survey done periodically in Switzerland is the Swiss Labor Force 
Survey. It includes detailed information on income but no information on lan-
guage skills except for language spoken at the interview. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the previous 
literature on the economics of language paying special attention to studies that 
analyze the difference in earnings among language groups in multilingual coun-
tries. In Section 3, we discuss the research topic we consider in this paper, which 
is the integration of the Swiss labor market. In Section 4, we present the data 
and describe briefly the modalities of the data collection. Section 5 introduces 
the methods we use to analyze the data, while the results are presented in Sec-
tion 6. Finally, Section 7 gives concluding remarks. 
2. Previous Literature
Since the 1960s there have been many studies on the link between earnings and 
language among immigrants. More recent contributions to this literature include 
C (1991), C and M (1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2002), 
D and  S (2001) and D and F (2003). Even 
though some useful insights can be obtained from these studies, we will not dis-
cuss them in detail as our analysis will not consider immigrants. 
More relevant to our present study and closer to the Swiss case is the prior 
research on language issues in Canada. This literature has been growing especially 
since the mid 60s when the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicultur-
alism made public a study showing a big earnings gap in favor of Anglophones 
in Montreal. A number of following studies, among them C (), 
G () and V (1979), confirmed that earnings of Franco phones 
were lower than earnings of Anglophones and returns from learning English for 
Francophones were higher than returns from learning French for Anglophones. 
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Different explanations have been given for this fact. Mostly, they refer to the con-
centration of power in the hands of English speakers in the English Canada and 
the disproportionate share of economic power of English speakers in Quebec. 
However the earnings disparities seemed to have declined considerably since 
the 70s. 
For Switzerland there are two previous studies by G (1997) and by G 
and S (1998), where they compare the socioeconomic status of German-
ophones, Francophones and Italophones. For a report completed for the Federal 
Office of Statistics (1997) Grin uses data collected for a project called ‘Linguis-
tic competences in Switzerland’. The sample consists of 2400 respondents and 
contains information on mother tongue and competences in other languages 
making the distinction between listening, writing, speaking and reading skills 
and between four levels of knowledge for each category. In this report he anal-
yses the relationship between earnings and language, separately for men and 
women, using adjusted residuals, multivariate regression and Oaxaca decompo-
sition analysis. He finds that for German and French speaking men there are no 
significant differences in terms of earnings, whereas Italophones seem to have 
significantly lower earnings than Germanophones. This result was confirmed 
in G and S (1998), where they analyse whether speaking Italian as 
mother tongue involves a penalty. For women, mother tongue does not seem 
to have any influence on earnings, as there is no significant difference between 
earnings of Germanophone, Francophone and Italophone females. In contrast 
to Grin, we use more recent data from a nationally representative sample and we 
control for self-selection. 
3. Does Language Matter?
In a multilingual country such as Switzerland, the various language regions 
could effectively produce a labor market that is segmented along language bor-
ders rather than fully integrated. There are a number of conceivable indicators 
of labor market integration. A first indicator would be the degree of wage equal-
ity and convergence across linguistic regions. The problem with this indicator is 
that wage differentials between regions are affected by non-linguistic factors as 
well, such as geography, institutions, industrial structure and the like. 
A second indicator would be the extent of mobility that takes place between 
language regions. Mobility is not the main concern of this paper, however. 
Rather, we propose an alternative indicator of labor market integration, namely 
the absence of wage discrimination. In any language region, otherwise equally 
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qualified workers should earn the same wage, regardless of their mother tongue. 
This is, of course, only a meaningful concept if we can assume that people living 
in Switzerland are truly bi- or tri-lingual. There is some evidence that this is the 
case although the increased importance of English is beginning to erode the 
time spent in school on learning a 2nd or 3rd national language. Still it is the 
case that children learn French in the German part of Switzerland, and German 
in the French part. 
Under the perfect integration hypothesis, we should observe that people who 
work and live where a language other than their mother tongue is dominant 
should have the same earnings as those for whom the mother tongue is the domi-
nant language, controlling for skills such as years of schooling and working expe-
rience. Note that this avoids wage comparisons across regions, comparisons that 
are made complicated by differences in industrial structure and in cost of living. 
Perfect integration so defined implies that workers, when considering where to 
work, should be indifferent with respect to the language region. 
There are a number of explanations why markets might be segmented, i.e., why 
the language frontier may mean more than just switching language.
1. Cultural differences between regions. Language origin can be related to cer-
tain cultural habits or prejudices that are rewarded differently in different 
regions.
2. Missing networks. The lack of social contacts for nonnatives can make it dif-
ficult for a person to find a job matching to his/her skills.
3. Differences in the school systems. When the quality of schooling differs from 
region to region, a person from a region with lower education quality receives 
a lower wage. 
4. The work experience acquired in the region of origin could be less valued than 
work experience obtained at the destination. 
If we find evidence for segmentation, the next step would be to identify its ori-
gins. 
4. Data
The empirical analysis is based on data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). 
The SHP is an annual survey of a nationally representative sample of more than 
5000 households and all its members who are older than 14. The data collection 
is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, the University of Neuchâ-
tel, and the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics. The interviews are held in French, 
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German, or Italian, depending on the preference of the respondent. The data 
collection method is Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). We use 
waves 1999 and 2000, which include information on the respondents’ language 
skills, canton of residence and other relevant socio-economic characteristics. The 
data from the SHP have been combined with data from the 1990 census, which 
provide some complementary information about regional and communal char-
acteristics of the respondents’ place of residence. We would have preferred to use 
the 2000 census for this purpose but these data were not yet available for public 
use at the time of writing this paper. 
In order to find out if there are differences in earnings of native and nonnative 
speakers living in a certain part of Switzerland we need to delimit each linguis-
tic region. To do this, we first determine the majority language spoken in each 
commune. In particular, we use information from the census on the percent-
age of people in each commune who speak a certain language as mother tongue, 
identified in the data as “first language for personal use”. These percentages were 
obtained by dividing the number of people who have a particular mother tongue 
by the total population in the commune. People who live in communes where 
more than 50% of the population speak French were categorized as belonging to 
the French region. People who live in communes where more than 50% of the 
population speak German were considered as belonging to the German region. 
Individuals can then be either classified as natives if their mother tongue matches 
the majority language, or as nonnatives else. Individuals from communes with 
no language predominance were excluded from the sample. Because of the small 
amount of observations we have in the SHP for Italian speakers and the Italian 
canton, these were exclude from the analysis as well. 
It could be argued that, for the purpose of our study, a more adequate defini-
tion of being native or nonnative should be based on the dominant language at 
the working place rather than at the place of residence. Unfortunately, this infor-
mation is not available in the data. All people living in a nonnative region and 
commuting to a native region would then be misclassified as nonnatives (and 
vice versa). We don’t think that this is a major problem in practice. However, the 
following results have to be interpreted under the (possibly invalid) assumption 
that the occurrence of cases for which dominant language at the place of resi-
dence and work differ does not bias the analysis systematically. 
The sample is restricted to Swiss born residents aged 18 to 65, whose annual 
full-time equivalent earnings are more than 10,000 Francs. After deleting records 
with missing data, we obtain a sample of 5199 pooled observations. In Table 1, 
we present the means of some selected variables, together with their estimated 
standard errors. The standard errors have been adjusted for pooling. We display 
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results separately for natives, nonnatives and for the whole sample. There are 
5075 individuals who live in a region where their mother tongue matches the 
dominant language and 124 whose mother tongue does not match the dominant 
language in their region of residence. The small number of nonnatives causes 
the standard errors of the variables’ means to be larger. 46% of the full sample 
are women but females are overrepresented among nonnatives, where their share 
amounts to 64%. The average level of education is about 14 years for both groups 
and the average level of experience is about 25 and 21 years for nonnatives and 
natives respectively. 
Mean earnings of nonnatives are about 0.03 log points (or 3 percent) below 
those of natives. Here and elsewhere, we will interpret differences in mean log-
earnings as relative differences in mean earnings (in levels). Strictly speaking, this 
interpretation is admissible under the additional assumption of homoskedasticity 
and for small log-differentials (W, 2001). 
The point estimate suggests that working in a region where one’s mother 
tongue is spoken is associate with higher earnings. However, a formal t-test for 
equal means cannot reject the null of no difference in earnings of natives and 
nonnatives (t = 0.74). So looking at overall averages, there appears to be no evi-
dence for a segmented labor market. However, this result may be spurious, as 
natives and nonnatives may differ in other observed or unobserved respects. 
Methods to account for such differences are discussed next. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Native 
(1) 
Nonnative 
(2) 
Whole Sample  
(3)  
Log earnings 11.25 11.22 11.25
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Years of schooling 13.67 13.69 13.67
(0.03) (0.20) (0.03)
Experience 21.35 24.62 21.43
(0.15) (0.98) (0.15)
Female 0.46 0.64 0.46
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Observations 5075 124 5199
Standard errors in parentheses.
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5. Empirical Methods
To test whether native and nonnative speakers have the same earnings, ceteris 
paribus, we adjust the raw differential using standard regression techniques. In 
particular, our analysis will be based on a human capital earnings function of 
the form: 
 w x nonnative′= α+ β+δ +ε  (1)
where w are logarithmic earnings, x is a vector of the individual’s personal char-
acteristics that affect earnings, and nonnative is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the individual’s mother tongue matches the dominant language in his/her 
region of residence and zero otherwise. The coefficient of nonnative, δ, measures 
the so-called treatment effect. The “treatment” in this case is whether or not the 
individual works in a region where the mother tongue is not the dominant lan-
guage. The null hypothesis to be tested is whether δ = 0, i.e. whether language 
has no effect on earnings once we control for other relevant characteristics. 
An issue that arises here is the potential endogeneity of the variable nonnative, 
that is the possibility that E(ε | nonnative) ≠ 0. We could have a positive correla-
tion between nonnatives and ε if individuals who move are positively self selected. 
In other words, the typical individual who decides to move, and thereby becomes 
a nonnative in terms of language, could have relatively higher earnings whether 
or not he chooses to move. 
To further analyze this issue, we assume that the decision to become a nonna-
tive obeys the following latent model: 
 nonnative z u∗ ′= γ+  (2)
 1  if 0,  i e  nonnative nonnative u z∗ ′= > . . >− γ
 0  if 0  i e  nonnative nonnative u z∗ ′= ≤ , . . ≤− γ
where z collects all variables in x plus any other variables that affect the moving 
decision but not earnings, for example those that capture mobility cost. The fol-
lowing proxies for mobility costs are used: a binary indicator variable for being 
married, an indicator variable for being married to a person who has a different 
mother tongue, an interaction between this variable and an indicator for gender 
being female, and number of children. 
We furthermore assume that x and z are exogenous, i.e. E(ε | x,z) = 0 and 
E(u | z) = 0. If u and ε are correlated direct estimation of the earnings equation 
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with OLS would produce selectivity bias, since the regressor nonnative is cor-
related with the error term (the regressor depends on u, and u and ε are corre-
lated). We will use various approaches to correct for the possibility that nonna-
tives might be positively self selected, and to analyze the robustness of the results 
depending on the model specification. 
5.1. Joint Normal Distribution and Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Assume that ε and u are bivariate normally distributed with mean zero, variances 
2
εσ  and 1, and correlation ρ. This is the well-known set-up discussed by H-
 (1974), who showed that the model parameters can be consistently estimated 
by either a two-step method or maximum likelihood. Under bivariate normality, 
the expected wage, conditional on being nonnative, is given by 
 ( | 1) ( )E w x z nonnative x z′ ′, , = = α+ β+δ+ ρλ γ  (3)
where λ is the inverse Mills ratio ( ) ( )z z′ ′φ γ /Φ γ  and φ and Φ are the density 
and cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, respec-
tively. If ρ = 0 there is no self-selection problem. However, if ρ > 0 then nonna-
tives are positively selected, i.e., their wages will exceed those of otherwise simi-
lar natives. 
To apply Heckman’s two step method, we estimate in a first step a probit 
model to obtain a consistent estimator of γ. Then we construct the variable λˆ  
as follows: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )  if 1z z nonnative′ ′λ= φ γ /Φ γ =
 ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1 ( )) if 0z z nonnative′ ′λ=−φ γ / −Φ γ =
In a second step we estimate Equation (3) by OLS using λˆ  instead of  λ. Stand-
ard errors need to be adjusted. 
An alternative method is to jointly estimate the earnings equation and the 
selection equation using full maximum likelihood (where the two-step estima-
tor may be used as starting value). Identification is achieved both through func-
tional form, and by virtue of excluding the mobility cost related variables (mari-
tal status, number of children) from the outcome equation. The disadvantage 
of these two methods is that they don’t work if the errors of both equations are 
not normally distributed. 
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5.2. Alternatives to Heckman’s method
There are a couple of possibilities to relax the strong assumptions underlying the 
previous model. A first possibility is to estimate the model without imposing that 
ε and u are bivariate normally distributed. Assume instead that only u is normally 
distributed. Then we can use the following two-step procedure: first, we esti-
mate the probit model ( ) ( )P nonnative z′=Φ γ  and obtain the fitted probabilities 
ˆ( )z′Φ γ . In a second step we estimate the following model by OLS. 
 ˆ( )w x z′ ′= α+ β+δΦ γ +ε  (4)
This is similar to two-stage least squares, only that the second equation is now 
non-linear. W (2002) refers to this as the “plug-in” model. As before, 
δ measures the treatment effect. OLS standard errors can be used to test the 
hypothesis H0 : δ = 0. If rejected, valid inference requires modifying the stand-
ard errors to account for generated regressors (W, 2002, p. 116). A 
disadvantage of this method is that consistency of the OLS estimators relies on 
the probit model being the correct specification, i.e. on the normality of u. 
If one wants to estimate without any distributional assumption, instrumental 
variable techniques can be applied. This of course requires that a good instru-
ment for the treatment is available. With more than one instrument the validity 
of the instruments can be tested. We will use the following instruments: number 
of kids, mixed marriage, female × mixed marriage and married, where married is a 
marital status indicator variable and mixed marriage is a dummy variable equal to 
one for people married to someone who has a different mother tongue. 
5.3. Classical Switching Regression Model
All methods so far are based on the outcome equation (1): this equation has a 
single error ε, which means that the gain (or loss) from moving to another region 
(and thus from becoming a nonnative) is the same, and equal to δ, for all persons. 
Therefore, if selectivity is present (if u and ε are correlated) it must be based on 
absolute advantage, as people who move would be better (or worse) than average 
in both regions. This may not be a very realistic characterization of the selection 
process, and we can instead allow for selection based on relative advantage. To 
obtain such a model, consider a more general approach where each group has its 
own earnings equation as follows: 
 0 0 0 0   if 0w x nonnative′= α + β +ε =  (5)
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 1 1 1 1   if 1w x nonnative′= α + β +ε =  (6)
Let the decision to move be generated from the same model as in equation (2). 
This is the classical switching regressions model in which the returns to the var-
iables included in x as well as the errors ε0 and ε1 of natives and nonnatives are 
potentially different (L, 1978). Different errors mean that a person could have 
above average earnings if she moved, but average earnings if she decided to stay. 
People who choose to move may be the ones who gain most from moving. 
In this case we estimate two models, one for natives and one for nonnatives. We 
use a two-step method proposed by L (1978) (see also H, T and 
V, 2000). Assume that ε0, ε1 and u have a trivariate normal distribution. 
Then, the procedure is as follows: first, we estimate a probit model of the deci-
sion to move and we compute λˆ  as in Section 5.1. In a second step we estimate 
Equations (5) and (6) including the correspondent λˆ  as an additional regressor. 
If we find that the coefficients of λˆ  are significant and different between groups 
then we have some evidence to think that nonnatives are self selected and that 
the decision to move is based on comparative advantage. 
A problem here is that we do not obtain an estimation of the treatment effect 
directly from the regression outcome. To obtain the treatment effect we need 
to do some extra calculations. At this point we should distinguish between two 
different parameters: the average treatment effect (ATE) and the effect of the 
treatment on the treated (TT). The ATE in our application is the expected 
gain or loss from moving for a randomly chosen individual and it is simply 
ATE ≡ E(w1 − w0). It can be estimated as 
 
1 0
1
1 ˆ ˆ( )
N
i
i
ATE x
N
=
′= −β β∑
The TT is the average gain or loss from moving for those who actually moved 
and it is defined as TT ≡ E(w1 − w0 | nonnative = 1). It can be estimated as 
  1 01 01 0
1
1 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )
J
j j
j
TT x
J
=
ρ ρ′= − + −σ σβ β λ∑
where the sum is taken over all observations for nonnatives. We did not need to 
make this distinction before as ATE equals TT in the case when ε1 = ε0. 
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6. Results
Two basic specifications of the earnings equation are reported in Table 2. The 
first one includes the variable nonnative, standard variables used in the human 
capital earnings function such as years of schooling and experience, a dummy var-
iable german region, to see whether there is a general premium for living in the 
German part regardless of the language one speaks, a variable for working status 
and a variable for place of residence. The second specification, in column (2), 
adds two variables to control for community characteristics of the respondent’s 
place of residence. These are the unemployment rate and the share of nonna-
tives who have the same mother tongue as the respondent in his/her commune 
of residence. Possibly, being nonnative is less of a problem the more nonnatives 
are present. In this case the effect of this variable would be positive. The models 
are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares and pooling together both years but 
correcting the standard errors to account for pooling observations. 
The coefficient of nonnative in column (1) is practically zero so there is no earn-
ings premium for natives when we hold the other human capital variables con-
stant. For years of schooling and experience the results are standard. For example, 
each additional year of schooling increases earnings by approximately 8%. The 
earnings of people living in the German part are estimated to be about 6% above 
those of people living in the French part. This effect is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The regional wage disparities might be due to differences in 
industrial structure and economic activity between regions. The coefficients of the 
variables full-time and urban show that full-time workers have a 6% premium and 
that people who live in an urban area earn in average 3% more than their coun-
terparts who live in a rural zone. The community variables added in column (2) 
are not significant. Therefore, we have no evidence that earnings of nonnatives 
are influenced by the proportion of people in the commune who speak the same 
language as mother tongue, or by the unemployment rate. For that reason, we will 
use the first specification of the earnings equation from now on. 
The estimate for the coefficient of nonnative would indicate that the labor 
markets are indeed perfectly integrated. However, as we said in Section 5, we 
might be overestimating the coefficient of nonnative if individuals who move are 
positively self selected. For this reason we proceed to methods described in the 
previous section to correct for selectivity bias. 
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 we report the results for Heckman’s two step 
and maximum likelihood methods respectively. The full set of results is given 
in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The coefficient of nonnative is now positive and 
insignificant in both cases. The estimated correlation ρˆ  is negative. Based on 
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Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Results 
(1) (2)  
Nonnative 0.001 0.010
(0.046) (0.053)
Education 0.078 0.079
(0.004)(c) (0.004)(c)
Experience 0.039 0.039
(0.003)(c) (0.003)(c)
Experience2/100 –0.060 –0.059
(0.006)(c) (0.006)(c)
Female –0.234 –0.231
(0.018)(c) (0.018)(c)
Year 2000 0.008 0.007
(0.009) (0.009)
German region 0.055 0.069
(0.015)(c) (0.020)(c)
Urban 0.029 0.024
(0.014)(b) (0.014)(a)
Full-time 0.058 0.050
(0.023)(b) (0.023)(b)
Unemployment rate 0.009
(0.009)
Percentage nonnatives in the commune –0.001
(0.002)
Constant 9.695 9.678
(0.072)(c) (0.072)(c)
Observations 5201 5103
R-squared 0.28 0.28
Dependent variable: logarithmic earnings; Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. 
(a) signiﬁ cant at 10%; (b) signiﬁ cant at 5%; (c) signiﬁ cant at 1%. 
Source: SHP, Waves 1999–2000. 
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the point estimate, an average person’s earnings would be between 8 and 11% 
higher than earnings of natives if he/she moved from his/her region of origin. 
People who move are negatively selected, i.e. the “worst” people move. However 
the coefficient is not significantly different from zero, so that we do not have any 
evidence to conclude that there is a selectivity problem. 
Table 3, columns (4) and (5), reports the results of the Plug-in and IV methods. 
Again, the coefficient of nonnative is positive and insignificant in both cases. As 
mentioned in Section 5.2, we use marital status related variables as instruments 
for the IV part. These are standard instruments as they are thought to influ-
ence the decision to move without affecting earnings directly. Indeed, a Sargan 
test for overidentification cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variables are 
valid instruments. 
When we perform a Hausman test to compare the coefficients from the OLS 
model with the coefficients from 2SLS we find that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the coefficient (χ2 = 0.06). This means that as 
before we have no evidence to suggest that E(ε | nonnative) ≠ 0. Therefore, confirm-
ing the results from the Heckman models, we find no evidence of self-selection. 
However, these results could be due to the fact that the models are misspeci-
fied or too restrictive. Next, we consider the possibility that people who move 
have a comparative advantage rather than an absolute advantage, i.e. we allow the 
error terms ε of both groups to differ. To do so we estimate a switching regression 
model. The results from the estimation of the natives and nonnatives equations 
are reported in Table 4, column (1) and (2) respectively, where we use the same 
Table 3: Treatment Effects with Endogenous Selection 
OLS 
(1) 
Heckman 2S 
(2) 
Heckman ML 
(3) 
Plug-in 
(4) 
IV  
(5)  
Nonnative 0.001 0.114 0.076 0.073 0.042
(0.046) (0.118) (0.098) (0.176) (0.146)
Lambda –0.057 –0.037
(0.055) (0.037)
Hausman test 0.06
Sargan test 8.32
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28
Dependent variable: logarithmic earnings; Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: SHP, Waves 1999–2000; n=5199. 
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specification of the earnings equation that we use for the OLS estimation. The 
full set of results is given in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
After performing an F-test to compare the coefficients from the natives and 
nonnatives equations we conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients from both equations are the same. There is no evidence that β 
differs between the two groups. Therefore we estimate another model where we 
allow only the errors to be different, which simplifies the analysis as we obtain 
again an estimate of the treatment effect parameter directly from the regression 
outcome. This is reported in column (3) of Table 4. 
The coefficient of nonnative is once again positive and insignificant. The sign 
of ρ1, that is the sign of the correlation between ε1 and u, is negative, which sug-
gests that people who lose more from moving are the ones who move (i.e., there 
is selection based on comparative disadvantage). This is also consistent with the 
negative treatment effect on the treated found in columns (1) and (2). These 
results would not make sense if people’s decision to move were based only on 
income considerations. Instead, this finding suggests that the individual decision 
to move is mostly based on other, not income-related, factors. 
Moreover, the results reported in column (3) show that the difference between 
λ0 and λ1 is not significant so we cannot reject the null hypothesis that ε1 = ε0. 
Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that either Heckman’s or the 2SLS methods 
Table 4: Treatment Effects in the Switching Regression Model 
Nonnative 
(1) 
Native 
(2) 
Whole Sample 
(3)  
Average treatment effect (nonnative) 0.388 0.179
(0.206)(a) (0.160)
Treatment effect on the treated –0.106 –0.079
(0.087) (0.348)
Lambda1 –0.171 –0.093
(0.083)(b) (0.074)
Lambda0 0.050 0.041
(0.12) (0.121)
Observations 124 5075 5199
R-squared 0.22 0.28 0.28
See Table 2. 
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are appropriate. Furthermore, as we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selec-
tivity we have no argument against using OLS. 
To repeat, the perfect integration hypothesis says that assuming perfect bilin-
gualism among the Swiss population, equally qualified workers should earn the 
same, regardless of their mother tongue. Depending on the detailed specification, 
the coefficient of nonnative is either zero (OLS) or positive but insignificant (after 
controlling for selectivity bias). The lack of precision is clearly affected by the small 
sample size, with only 124 observations on nonnatives. How strong evidence is this 
with regard to the perfect integration hypothesis? Note that we would require the 
finding of a significant negative coefficient in order to reject perfect integration. 
Thus, at a minimum, the evidence is compatible with integrated labor markets. 
7. Conclusions
This paper was concerned with the earnings of natives and nonnatives living 
in the German and French linguistic regions of Switzerland. The hypothesis to 
be tested was that equally qualified workers residing in the same region should 
have the same earnings regardless of their mother tongue, i.e. the labor market 
is perfectly integrated. 
The evidence for the empirical analysis was based on data from the first and 
second waves of the Swiss household panel for the years 1999 and 2000. In the 
study we used a human capital earnings function to which we added specific 
variables to control for the influence of language. The results show no evidence 
of a negative earnings differential between nonnatives and natives even after 
accounting for self-selection of internal migrants. Therefore we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the Swiss labor market is perfectly integrated. On the other 
hand, we did not find any evidence to suggest that people who move are posi-
tively self selected. Indeed, individuals who move don’t seem to have neither an 
absolute nor a comparative advantage. This finding suggests that people move 
for reasons other than earnings. 
This paper is the first study of its kind using data from the Swiss Household 
Panel. Because we consider the topic of this paper of substantial policy concern, 
the question of the ways in which the individual’s mother tongue can affect 
one’s economic wealth still needs to be examined more thoroughly. In order to 
deepen the analysis, we plan to use in further studies data on regional and com-
munal characteristics from the census 2000 instead of 1990 as well as a data set 
with more information about Italian speakers and the Italian canton in order to 
include them in the analysis. 
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Appendix A: Variables
Name Description  
Log earnings The natural logarithm of the annual gross work income (before taxes and 
social security contributions) in the year prior to the interview. We use 
the real income to account for changes in price levels. For this purpose we 
deflate the nominal incomes from 1998 and 1999 using the correspond-
ent CPI published by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics (1998 = 98.0, 
1999 = 98.8). As we include part and full-time workers we need to adjust 
the earnings of part-time workers in order to make them comparable 
with earnings of full-time workers. In order to do this we compute full-
time equivalent earnings dividing reported earnings by the percentage of 
employment.  
Nonnative Dummy variable that equals 1 for people who live in a community where 
their mother tongue, defined as first language for personal use, matches the 
dominant language and zero otherwise.
German region Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent lives in the German region.
Years of schooling It was constructed assigning numbers between 7 and 18 to the variable 
‘highest obtained education’.
Experience = age − education − 6.
Female Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a female and 0 otherwise.
Year 2000 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the year 2000 
and 0 otherwise.
Urban Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent lives in an urban area and 0 
otherwise.
Full-time Dummy variable equal to 1 if the person works more than 80% and 0 oth-
erwise.
Married Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is married or has a partner 
and 0 otherwise.
Mixed Marriage Dummy variable equal to one for people married to a person who has 
another mother tongue.
Number of kids Number of kids.
Percentage of 
nonnatives in the 
commune 
Percentage of nonnatives in the respondent’s commune who have the same 
mother tongue as the respondent.
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Appendix B: Tables
Table B.1:  Regression Results for Models With Endogenous Selection  
Heckman 2-step 
earnings    selection
Maximum 
earnings
Likelihood
selection
 Plug-in IV
Nonnative 0.114 0.028 0.076 0.027 0.073 0.042
(0.118) (0.02) (0.098) (0.021) (0.176) (0.146)
Years of schooling 0.078 0.032 0.078 0.030 0.078 0.078
(0.003)(c) (0.017)(a) (0.004)(c) (0.023) (0.004)(c) (0.003)(c)
Experience 0.039 –0.038 0.039 –0.036 0.039 0.039
(0.002)(c) (0.037) (0.003)(c) (0.048) (0.003)(c) (0.002)(c)
Experience2/100  –0.060 0.140 –0.060 0.144 –0.061 –0.060
(0.006)(c) (0.108) (0.005)(c) (0.134) (0.006)(c) (0.005)(c)
Female –0.235 0.763 –0.235 0.787 –0.235 –0.234
(0.015)(c) (0.186)(c) (0.018)(c) (0.242)(c) (0.018)(c) (0.015)(c)
Year 2000 0.008 0.035 0.008 0.032 0.008 0.008
(0.012) (0.086) (0.009) (0.059) (0.009) (0.012)
German region 0.060 –0.678 0.058 –0.677 0.058 0.056
(0.015)(c) (0.086)(c) (0.016)(c) (0.110)(c) (0.017)(c) (0.015)(c)
Urban 0.030 –0.110 0.030 –0.105 0.030 0.030
(0.013)(c) (0.093)(c) (0.014)(b) (0.093) (0.014)(b) (0.013)(b)
Full-time 0.059 –0.104 0.058 –0.102 0.058 0.058
(0.017)(c) (0.115) (0.023)(b) (0.140) (0.023)(b) (0.017)(c)
Mixed marriage 0.764 0.787
(0.186)(c) (0.242)(c)
Female mixed marriage 1.044 1.016
(0.248)(c) (0.322)(c)
Married –0.417 –0.425
(0.102)(c) (0.134)(c)
Number of children –0.058 –0.054
(0.052) (0.059)
Lambda –0.057 –0.037
(0.055) (0.037)
Constant 9.69 –2.196 9.692 –2.175 9.692 9.693
(0.054)(c) (0.385)(c) (0.072)(c) (0.416)(c) (0.072)(c) (0.054)(c)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(a) significant at 10%; (b) significant at 5%; (c) significant at 1%. 
Source: SHP, Waves 1999–2000; n=5199.
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Table B.2: Regression Results for Switching Regression Model  
Nonnatives 
(1) 
Natives 
(2) 
Whole sample  
(3)  
Nonnative 0.179
(0.16)
Years of schooling 0.061 0.079 0.078
(0.030)(b) (0.004)(c) (0.004)(c)
Experience 0.01 0.040 0.039
(0.024) (0.003)(c) (0.003)(c)
Experience2/100 –0.014 –0.062 –0.061
(0.047) (0.006)(c) (0.006)(c)
Female –0.365 –0.231 –0.233
(0.101)(c) (0.018)(c) (0.018)(c)
Year 2000 –0.016 0.009 0.008
(0.08) (0.009) (0.009)
German region 0.106 0.051 0.052
(0.114) (0.018)(c) (0.018)(c)
Urban 0.189 0.025 0.029
(0.094)(b) (0.014)(a) (0.014)(b)
Full-time 0.018 0.061 0.059
(0.106) (0.023)(c) (0.023)(c)
Lambda1 –0.171 –0.093
(0.083)(b) (0.074)
Lambda0 0.050 0.041
(0.120) (0.121)
Constant 10.639 9.688 9.694
(0.602)(c) (0.072)(c) (0.072)(c)
Observations 124 5075 5199
R-squared 0.22 0.28 0.28
See Table 2. 
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SUMMARY 
The paper analyzes the effect of mother tongue on labor market outcomes of 
Swiss residents. This type of analysis can shed light on an important policy ques-
tion. Is the Swiss labor market well integrated, or can one find instead segmenta-
tion along language borders? Improving on previous research in this area, we use 
a nationally representative household survey, the Swiss Household Panel 1999 
and 2000, and we explicitly account for self-selection of workers into language 
areas. Overall, we find no evidence to suggest that the Swiss labor market is not 
perfectly integrated or that internal migrants are positively selected. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In diesem Aufsatz analysieren wir die Auswirkungen der Muttersprache auf den 
Arbeitsmarkterfolg von Bewohnern der Schweiz. Die wirtschaftspolitische Bedeu-
tung rührt daher, dass eine derartige Analyse Hinweise zur sprachgrenzlichen 
Integration oder Segmentation des Arbeitsmarktes liefern kann. Wir verwenden 
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Daten einer national repräsentativen Haushaltsbefragung, das Schweizerische 
Haushaltspanel, für die Jahre 1999 und 2000, und wir modellieren explizit die 
Selbstselektion der Arbeiter in die Sprachregionen. Zusammenfassend finden wir 
weder Hinweise für eine Segmentierung, noch solche für eine positive Selektion 
bei der sprachgrenzlichen Mobilität. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Dans cet article nous analysons l’effet de la langue maternelle sur le succès des 
habitants suisses dans le marché de travail. Avec une telle analyse, on peut appren-
dre si le marché du travail suisse est bien intégré ou segmenté à travers des fron-
tières de la langue. Nous utilisons une enquête de ménage nationale représenta-
tive, le Panel suisse des ménages pour les années 1999 et 2000, et nous modelons 
excactement l’autosélection des ouvriers dans les régions linguistiques. En résumé, 
nous ne trouvons ni d’indications pour une segmentation du marché de travail 
ni pour l’autosélection. 
